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Abstract
While ‘most’ and ‘more than half’ are generally assumed to be truth-conditionally equivalent, the former is usually interpreted as conveying greater proportions than the latter. Previous work has attempted to explain this difference in terms of pragmatic strengthening or
variation in meanings. In this paper, we propose a novel explanation that keeps the truthconditions equivalence. We support this explanation with a computational model of usage
in the Rational Speech Act framework. We
find that the difference in typical proportions
associated with the two expressions can be explained with previously independently motivated semantic and pragmatic mechanisms.

1

Introduction

According to their standard analysis, sentences
‘most As are B’ and ‘more than half of As are
B’ (with A and B referring to two sets A and B)
are verified by the same As and Bs, i.e. are truthconditionally equivalent. Specifically, ‘most As are
B’ is analysed as conveying that the size of A ∩ B
is greater than the size of A − B, whereas ‘More
than half of As are B’ is analysed as conveying that
the size of A ∩ B is greater than half the size of A
(Hackl, 2009):1
JmostK(A)(B) ⇐⇒ |A ∩ B| > |A − B| (1)
1
JMTHK(A)(B) ⇐⇒ |A ∩ B| > |A|
(2)
2
In contrast to this assumption, the behaviours of
‘most’ and ‘more than half’ differ in several ways.
The differences between ‘most’ and ‘more than
half’ call for an explanation. Early work has focused on the different behaviour of the two expressions with respect to their upper bounds (Ariel,
1

In the following, we assume for simplicity that A and B
are two finite sets. For a slightly more general definition in
terms of measure functions see Solt (2016).

2003) or their cognitive encoding, which has been
argued to lead to different verification procedures
(Hackl, 2009). More recent work has focused on
the more general fact that ‘most’ typically conveys
proportions higher than ‘more than half’. Following Denić and Szymanik (2020), we can categorize
the explanations for this difference in two classes.
First, the pragmatic strengthening hypotheses
claim that while the two expressions are truthconditionally identical, ‘most’ is pragmatically
strengthened, resulting in a threshold higher than
‘more than half’. This strengthening can happen,
e.g., through a scalar implicature or through an
R-implicature. Solt (2016) argues for the latter option and claims that the reason why ‘most’ receives
a different interpretation to begin with is a (non
truth-conditional) difference in the types of scales
underlying the two expressions. On the other hand,
lexical meaning hypotheses attempt to explain these
differences in terms of a truth-conditional difference in their logical forms, which can come from,
e.g., conventionalization of implicatures or from
‘most’ being a vague quantifier. More recent work
has produced experimental evidence supporting the
hypothesis of a semantic difference between the
two expressions: Ramotowska et al. (2019) have
observed a difference in decision times and behaviour of subjects verifying sentences with the
two quantifiers that are consistent with the model
in which threshold for ”more than half” is 50% and
threshold for ”most” is higher. Denić and Szymanik
(2020) have reported that the thresholds of ”most”
does not change under the downward monotone
environment and remains higher that the threshold
for ”more than half”. This finding also suggest that
the difference between the two quantifiers is due to
semantics.
In this paper, we propose a novel explanation of
the difference between ‘most’ and ‘more than half’.
We argue that two independently needed mecha-
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nisms in the pragmatic interpretation of quantifiers
suffice to predict the difference between the two
expressions, without assuming a difference in scale
structures or truth conditions. The first mechanism
is the tendency of the listener to guess points central to a category, in order to minimize the expected
distance between their own guess and the speaker’s
observation. The second mechanism is the structural theory of conceptual alternatives, which lets
the alternative set of an utterance depend on the
structure of the concept conveyed by the utterance.
We show that these mechanisms make the correct
predictions with a computational model of pragmatics, the Rational Speech Act model.

2

Solt’s account

In order to identify the differences between ‘most’
and ‘more than half’, Solt (2016) considers all appearances of the two expressions as quantifiers in
the nominal domain in the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA) (Davies, 2017). While
various differences emerge when comparing the
two expressions, in order to compare the typical
proportions for which the two expressions are used
those appearances were selected which included a
specific percentage (n = 54 for ‘more than half’
and n = 141 for ‘most’). The corpus data shows
that (1) ‘more than half’ is mostly used for percentages in the 50%-65% range, (2) ‘most’ has a
much flatter distribution which covers the whole
50%-100% range.
The difference between the upper bounds and
that between the lower bounds of the typical sets
of ‘most’ and ‘more than half’ receive separate explanations in Solt’s account. In order to explain
the difference in lower bounds, Solt proposes that
the scales that underlie the two expressions are different. According to Solt, ‘more than half’ uses
a ratio scale, while ‘most’ uses an ordinal scale.2
While two points on a ratio scale can be compared
in terms of the proportion between them, points
on an ordinal scale can only be compared in terms
of which one is the greater or lower of the two
(Stevens, 1946). Therefore, to say that the scale
underlying ‘most’ is an ordinal scale means that an
expression such as ‘most A B’ only requires us to
determine whether the size of A ∩ B is greater than
the size of A − B. On the other hand, ‘more than
half of As B’ requires us to compare the size of
2

Technically, Solt argues that ‘most’ also allows for semiordered scales. We return to semi-ordered scales below.
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A ∩ B to a proportion of the size of A, namely A/2.
Since ratio scales allow arbitrarily precise comparisons between points, Solt’s account predicts the
lower bound of ‘more than half’ to be closer to 0.5
than the lower bound of ‘most’, as observed in the
corpus data.
On the other hand, Solt accounts for the difference in the upper bounds of the two expressions
with scalar implicatures. Solt points out that ‘more
than half’ has a rich set of alternative utterances,
including ‘more than two thirds’ and ‘more than
three quarters’. On the other hand, the alternative
utterances to ‘most’ are more sparse, including ‘all’.
Since the set of alternative utterances is more finegrained for ‘more than half’ than for ‘most’, scalar
implicatures constrain the upper bound of the former to be lower than the latter. Solt proposes that
the reason why the two expressions have different
sets of alternatives is the different types of scales
underlying them. In the next section, we introduce
an alternative account that explains the difference
between ‘most’ and ‘more than half’ without assuming a difference in the scales underlying the
two expressions.

3 Two mechanisms in the pragmatics of
quantifiers
In this section, we present our account in non formal terms. Our account explains the difference in
typical set between ‘most’ and ‘more than half’,
and is based on two phenomena relating to the interpretation of quantifiers. The first is the idea that
the listener attempts to minimize the difference
between their own guess and the speaker’s observation, the second is the fact that different conceptual
structures cause different sets of alternatives. We
next consider these two mechanisms in turn.
3.1

Distance-minimizing listeners

Some semantic domains, such as nationality, football teams, or personal identity, are not usually
structured by relations of similarity. For instance,
it is nonsensical to claim that Billy the kid is closer,
in terms of his identity, to Jesse James than Doc
Holliday.3 On the other hand, the members of some
semantic domains, such as the domain of numbers,
colors, or proportions, enter in relations of similarity to each other. For instance, two shades of blue
3

There are feature with respect to which two individuals
might be more or less close to each other, but this does not
concern their identity as such.

are closer to each other than either of them is to a
shade of red.
In many cases, when communication happens in
domains structured by distance, and the listener’s
task is to construct a representation of the world
state given a description produced by the speaker,4
communicative success is not simply a function of
whether the listener’s representation is identical or
not to the true world state. Rather, success is a(n
inverse) function of the similarity between the true
state of the world and the listener’s guess. In other
words, communication is more or less successful
depending on whether the listener’s guess is more
or less dissimilar (respectively) from the true world
state.
In this perspective, it is a sensible strategy for a
listener to not simply sample from the set of possible world states given their probability after receiving the message, but rather to attempt to minimize
the expected distance between their guess and the
true world state. For instance, if the speaker utters
‘blue’, the listener might select a shade of blue that
is located around the center of the blue category,
because a point near the center of the category will
have a lower expected distance to the true world
state than a point that is around the margin of the
category. Previous literature supports this idea that
listeners should tend to guess the center of a category when communicative success depends on the
similarity between true state and listener’s guess,
e.g. Jäger et al. (2011) showed that the optimal
strategy for such so-called simmax signaling games
involves a listener that guesses the central point in
the category.
Consistently with previous literature,5 we will
assume in the rest of this paper that communication with quantifiers happens on a semantic domain
structured by a distance, namely the scales of proportions and numbers.6 Moreover, we claim that
in communication with quantifiers, communicative success is of the graded type presented above.
For instance, if 1/2 of the As are B, the communication is more successful if the listener guesses
|A ∩ B|/|A| = 0.6 than if the speaker guesses 0.9.
This implies that a rational listener does not guess
4
This communicative setup is called descriptive by Franke
(2014), who opposes it to referential communicative games. In
the following, we limit ourselves to discussions of descriptive
communication.
5
See chapter 2 of Carcassi (2020) for an overview.
6
In the following, we will focus on the scale of proportions,
but what we say can be easily generalized to the scale of
numbers.

a proportion simply by sampling from the posterior
over proportions conditional on the received signal,
but rather they attempt to minimize the expected
distance between their guess and the true state of
the world.
The tendency for the listener to guess a state that
minimizes the expected distance to the speaker’s
observation, when in a scalar semantic domain, is
not only a result about rational agents, but also
aligns with the way we use quantifiers in practice.
For instance, imagine receiving the signal ‘between
50 and 100’, and creating a representation of the
world state. Even within the part of the scale of
integers covered by the expression—e.g. numbers
between 50 and 100—the guess does not happen
uniformly. Rather, we intuitively tend to guess an
integer that is around the center of the category, i.e.
around 75. In other words, we are less likely to
select a number close to the category boundaries,
such as 99. As we discuss in more detail below,
the situation is subtler when multiple possible utterances are involved.
3.2

The structural account of alternatives

As discussed above, Solt’s explanation for the different comparison sets of ‘most’ and ‘more than
half’, which produces in her account the different
upper bounds, is based on the difference between
the scale types. We propose an alternative explanation for the difference in the sets of alternative
utterances which does not rely on scale structure.
In particular, we rely on the structural account of
alternatives (Katzir, 2007; Fox and Katzir, 2011;
Trinh and Haida, 2015) to explain why ‘most’ and
‘more than half’ have different sets of alternative
utterances.
The structural theory of alternatives starts with
the idea of a structural alternative. ψ is a structural alternative to φ (ψ . φ) iff ψ is structurally
at most as complex as φ, i.e. ψ can be obtained
from φ through a “finite series of deletions, contractions, and replacements of constituents of φ”
with constituents of the same category taken from
the lexicon (Katzir, 2007). The core idea is to define the set Astr (φ) of utterances alternative to φ
as follows:
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Astr (φ) = {ψ|ψ . φ}

(3)

In words, the set of utterances that enter in the
calculation of implicatures for φ is the set of utterances that are structurally at most as complex as
φ.

While the original criterion for alternatives in
Katzir (2007) is a syntactic one, there is emerging theoretical and experimental evidence that it
is best characterized as acting not on the syntactic
structure, but rather on the conceptual structure of
utterances (Chemla, 2007; Buccola et al., 2018).
The structural account of conceptual alternatives is
still being developed, however in the following we
limit ourselves to using the basic idea in equation
3, as it is all we need for the present purposes.
In the following, we make two crucial assumptions about the way alternatives are generated for
the expressions under consideration. First, not
every expression of the form ‘a b’ is considered,
where a is a cardinal number and b an ordinal number such that a ≤ b. If every a and b were considered, the set of alternatives to ‘one half’ would
be the set of rational numbers in the unit interval.
Various factors plausibly restrict the set of considered numbers. First, the listener can generally assume that the speaker has noisy measurement of the
true proportion, and therefore only produces utterances implying at most a certain level of granularity. Moreover, the communicative aims generally
do not require transmission of precise proportions.
The idea that the notion of alternative is graded and
depends on the complexity of the concept, developed in Buccola et al. (2018), could also account
for why ‘five sixth’ seems to compete with simpler
fractions such as ‘two thirds’, while the opposite
is not true; the difference would depend on the different conceptual complexity of different fractions.
We do not develop this idea further in the present
paper.7
The second assumption we make is that ‘most’
and ‘more than half’ are conceptually structured
as proposed by Hackl (2009), i.e. as in equations 1
and 2 above. The main consequence of this assumption is that ‘two thirds’ and structurally equivalent
expressions are alternatives to ‘half’ according to
the criterion in equation 3.
Under the two assumptions just discussed, the
criterion defined in equation 3 has the correct
consequences for the cases at hand. Namely,
Astr (‘most’) contains ‘all’ and does not contain
‘more than three quarters’. On the other hand,
Astr (‘(one) half’) contains e.g. ‘three quarters’.
In this section, we have presented two mechanisms that play a role in the way quantifiers are
7
Thanks to Milica Denić for recommending the literature
on conceptual alternatives.
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interpreted. These two mechanisms have already
been discussed in the literature in other contexts.
While our approach relies on a difference in conceptual structures, the account remains a pragmatic
account insofar as conceptual structure affects the
results only indirectly by causing a difference in alternative sets, rather than directly as in Solt (2016).
The main contribution of this paper is therefore
to show how these two mechanisms can, without
recourse to the scale types discussed by Solt, explain the difference between ‘most’ and ‘more than
half’ with respect to the proportions that the two
expressions typically convey.
In the next section, we model the mechanisms
we discussed. We consider a pragmatic speaker
who picks ‘most’ or ‘more than half’ not simply as
a function of their extension on the scale of proportions, but instead also implicitly selecting the set
of alternatives that will allow a pragmatic listener
to choose a proportion that is as close as possible
to the speaker’s observation. Since a pragmatic
listener guesses points closer to 0.5 for a rich alternative set such as the one induced by ‘more than
half’, the speaker selects ‘more than half’ for such
proportions. On the other hand, since the listener
will guess alternatives close to 0.75 for ‘most’, the
speaker produces ‘more than half’ for such proportions. In order to formalize this intuition, in
the next section we present the RSA modelling
framework for pragmatic language use.

4 An RSA model of the two mechanisms
4.1

Basic RSA model

The RSA framework is meant to model the process
of recursive mindreading that lies behind the pragmatic interpretation or production of utterances
(Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013; Franke, 2014;
Frank et al., 2017). RSA models usually start with
a pragmatic listener who interprets utterances based
on the simulated behaviour of a pragmatic speaker.
The pragmatic speaker in turn given an observation
tends to choose the most useful utterance for a literal listener who interprets it based solely on its
literal meaning. We will first explain the simplest
type of RSA model, and then a modification that
will be useful to model numerals.
The simplest RSA model starts with a set of utterances u and a set of possible states s. The meaning
of each utterance can be encoded as the set of those
states that verify the utterance. The pragmatic listener L1 receives an utterance u and calculates a

4.2

Figure 1: Simple RSA model with three possible utterances u (y-axis) and three states s (x-axis). L1 calculates a scalar implicature for utterances u1 and u2
(α = 4). The left, central, and right plots correspond
to L0 , S1 , and L1 respectively. Note that the color indicates the probability of guessing a state given a signal
for L0 and L1 , and the probability of producing a signal
given a state for S1 .

posterior over states by Bayesian update, combining their prior over states with the probability that
the pragmatic speaker S1 would have produced the
utterance given each state:
pL1 (s|u) ∝ pL1 (s)pS1 (u|s)

(4)

The pragmatic speaker in turn observes a state
and produces an utterance that aims at optimizing
the utility U (u|s) for a literal listener L0 given the
state, while minimizing the utterance cost:
pS1 (u|s) ∝ exp(αU (u|s) − c(u))

(5)

The utility U (u|s) is the negative surprisal of the
state given the utterance, so that the speaker favours
utterances that make the state less surprising for
the literal listener:
U (u|s) = log(pL0 (s|u))

(6)

Finally, the probability that literal listener L0
attributes to each state given an utterance is simply
0 if the utterance is not verified by the state, and
proportional to the prior for the state otherwise:
(
p(s) if s verifies u
pL0 (s|u) ∝
(7)
0
otherwise
Figure 1 shows L0 , S1 , and L1 in this simple RSA
model. The crucial phenomenon that can be observed in figure 1 is that L1 calculates a scalar
implicature: although utterance u1 is, in its literal
sense, compatible with both s1 and s2 , S1 tends
to produce u1 mostly for s2 , because when s1 is
observed S1 tends to use the more useful signal u1 .
Therefore, when hearing u1 L1 is more likely to
guess s2 .
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Distance based listeners

In the simple RSA models above, the success
of communication is binary, solely a function of
whether the listener’s guess coincides with the
speaker’s observed state. This is plausible in cases
where the set of states has no internal structure.
However, as discussed above in the case where
a notion of distance is well-defined on the set of
states, the listener might not be simply trying to
guess the speaker’s observation, but rather might
strive to minimize the (expected) distance between
the state they select and the speaker’s observation.8
In order to model the effects of a well-defined
distance D on the set of states, we modify the listener L1 so that instead of selecting a state by sampling from their posterior distribution given the
signal, they try to minimize the expected distance
between their selection s and the true state. Therefore, we define the choice probability for listeners
as follows:9
!
X
pCL (s|u) ∝ exp −ρ
pL1 (i|u)D(i, s)
i∈states

(8)
where ρ is the parameter of a softmax function
which determines how strongly the listener tends
to minimize the expected distance and pL1 is defined as above in equation 4. The listener described
in equation 8 tends therefore to minimize the expected linear distance function. Figure 2 shows
the effects of this modification of the model for
20 states, when D(sn , sm ) = |n − m|. The right
plot shows that in this modified RSA model, L1
tends to guess points that are located centrally in
the category, after the category has been restricted
by scalar implicature.
4.3

Varying sets of alternatives

The modification to the basic RSA model above
is an implementation of the first mechanism discussed in section 3. The second mechanism con8
Cf previous work where the effects of a distance structure
affects the speaker but not the listener, such as Franke (2014).
It is worth noticing that our model does not have more degrees
of freedom than Franke’s model: while we introduce one more
parameter than the basic RSA model to regulate the listener’s
tendency to minimize expected distance, Franke introduces
one parameter to regulate the amount of pragmatic slack. We
do not investigate in this work the differences between the two
approaches.
9
We apply this modification only to L1 , assuming that the
attempt to minimize distance is something above and beyond
the literal reading of the signals. We leave to future work an
investigation of the effects of modifying both listeners.

Figure 2: RSA model with a distance-minimizing L1 .
The model displayed in the plot use a language with
three utterances and 20 states. The listener L1 do
not simply guess the signal observed by the speaker
by sampling their posterior, but rather attempt to minimize the expected distance between their guess and the
speaker’s observation (α = 4, ρ = 2). See figure 1 for
more detail.

cerns the way that the comparison set depends on
the speaker’s utterance.
In the basic RSA framework, the set of possible utterances considered by the pragmatic speaker
and the pragmatic listener that the speaker models
are identical. However, according to the structural
account of alternatives discussed above the set of
utterances considered by the listener depends on
the actual utterance that is picked by the speaker.
For instance, if the speaker utters ‘101’, the listener
will consider all alternative utterances that are at
most at a similar level of granularity as 101, such
as 91 and 100. However, if the speaker utters ‘100’,
the listener in the model considers an alternatives
set containing e.g. only 90 and 100, but not 101.
In order to model this in the RSA model, we
introduce a speaker S2 . S2 , much like S1 , tends to
select the signal that minimizes the listener’s surprise for the real state given the signal. However,
the set of alternative utterances considered by L1
is not independent of the signal received by L1 .
Instead, the set of alternative utterances considered
by L1 (and therefore by the lower levels S1 and
L0 ) depends on the actual utterance of S2 , as described in the section on the structural account of
alternatives above. The model below is therefore a
production model.
This picture of alternatives is in many respects
a simplification. For instance, it is likely that from
the point of the listener there is uncertainty as to
the set of alternatives that ought to be considered
in the context. More complex discussions of issues related to granularity and alternatives can be
found in the literature, see e.g. Bastiaanse (2011)
for numerals. However, these more complex models are not needed to explain the issue at hand, and
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Figure 3: Structure of modified RSA model. The set of
alternative utterances considered by L1 is not fixed, but
rather depends on the received utterance. Moreover, L0
and L1 do not simply guess a state based on their posterior probability given the received signal, but rather
tend to guess a state that is expected to be close to the
speaker’s observation.

therefore we leave investigation of the subtleties to
future work.
In sum, the only requirements for this model to
apply are (1) that the listener is trying to minimise
the distance between their guess and the speaker’s
observation, and (2) that some terms have an alternatives set that is more granular than other ones.
In particular, it applies even if the two expressions
that induce different granularities are synonymous.
In this section, we have formalized the two
mechanisms discussed in section 3 within the RSA
framework. The resulting model is summarized
in natural language in figure 3. In the resulting
model, structurally different expressions induce the
pragmatic listener to consider different sets of alternative utterances. Moreover, the listener does
not simply guess uniformly from the enriched part
of the parameter space, but rather tends to guess
points that are central in the pragmatically enriched
category. Therefore, even intensionally equivalent
expressions will be used differently, as long as they
are structurally different. In the next section, we
show how this model applies to the specific case of
the contrast between ‘most’ and ‘more than half’.

5 An alternatives account of ‘most’ vs
‘most than half’
5.1

An RSA model of the contrast

In the following, we will model communication
with quantifiers by applying the RSA model described above to the following simple referential
communication task, modelled after Pezzelle et al.

Utterance
All (∀)
Most
None (¬∃)
Some (∃)
MT a half (> 1/2)
MT one third (> 1/3)
MT two thirds (> 2/3)
LT a half (< 1/2)
LT one third (< 1/3)
LT two thirds (< 2/3)

Extension
{1}
(1/2, 1]
{0}
(0, 1]
(1/2, 1]
(1/3, 1]
(2/3, 1]
[0, 1/2)
[0, 1/3)
[0, 2/3)

Table 1: Meaning of each signal in the model.
MT=‘more than’, LT=‘less than’.

(2018) where communication was set up similarly
in a production task. A speaker observes two sets,
A and B, and attempts to communicate to a listener which proportion of A is also in B in the way
modelled by the modified RSA model introduced
above. As possible signals, we have chosen the
lexically simple Aristotelian quantifiers and some
minimal set of alternatives for ‘more than half’.
The literal meaning of each quantifier in the model
corresponds to a portion of the scale of proportions
(see table 1). This set of utterances is closed under
substitution of ‘more’ by ‘less’, and by (semantically meaningful) substitutions of one, two, and
three (both their cardinal and ordinal versions) with
each other.
As in the modified RSA model presented above,
the alternatives considered by the pragmatic listener depend on the speaker’s utterance. For instance, if the speaker uttered ‘some’ the listener
would consider a set of alternatives containing ‘all’
but not ‘more than two thirds’, while if the speaker
uttered ‘more than one third’ both ‘all’ and ‘more
than two thirds’ would be possible options for the
listener. In the present case, the utterances above
can be divided in two groups, the first containing
‘all’, ‘most’, ‘none’, and ‘some’, and the second
containing the remaining utterances. Each utterance in the first group contains all other utterances
in that group as alternatives, and none of the utterances in the second group. Each of the utterances
in the second group contains all utterances in its
set of alternatives.10
In order to isolate the effects of the account of
10
While previous work has argued that utterances with different monotonicity profiles do not appear in the same set of
alternatives (e.g. Horn, 1989), Katzir (2007) has argued the
structural theory of alternatives can lift this restriction.

Figure 4: The plots shows the results with |A| = 100,
α = 3 and ρ = 1. Each plot shows the behaviour of a
different agent in the RSA model.

alternatives discussed above from the consequences
of utterance cost, we assume that signals have no
cost. Moreover, to keep the results as simple as
possible S2 can only produce ‘all’, ‘most’, ‘none’,
‘some’, ‘more than a half’ and ‘less than a half’.
In order for the speaker to be able to calculate a
distribution over utterances given any state, there
has to be at least one utterance to refer to each state
in each set of alternative utterances.
The results of the model are shown in figure
4. L0 guesses uniformly within the categories expressed by each signal considered by S2 . L0 treats
‘most’ and ‘more than half’ identically, guessing
uniformly among the states between 51 and 100.
Finally, S0 selects the maximum for ‘every’ and
the minimum for ‘none’.
With S1 , the set of alternatives for each signal
matters (second plot from top in figure 4). More
specifically, while the lower bound for both ‘most’
and ‘more than half’ are similar for S1 , their upper
bounds are different as a consequence of the different ways that the respective set of alternatives
cover the scale. ‘More than half’ implicates less
than two thirds, and therefore tends to not be used
for proportions higher than two thirds, while most
only implicates ‘not all’. Note that while the six
signals are plotted together in figure 4, the distribution for each signal is computed independently
with a possibly different set of alternatives utterances. Therefore, S1 does not suffice to explain the
difference between ‘most’ and ‘more than half’.
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L1 tends to pick the central point in the categories as produced by S1 (third plot from top in
figure 4). Therefore, L1 tends to guess points closer
to the middle of the scale for ‘more than half’ than
for ‘most’, because the former is produced by S1
for a range of proportions closer to the scale’s midpoint. Finally, the pragmatic speaker S2 tends to
pick ‘more than half’ for signals closer to the midpoint of the scale than ‘most’ (bottom plot in figure
4).
The results in figure 4, while qualitatively correct, are quantitatively surprising in two respects.
First, the upper bound of ‘most’ is lower in the
results shown in figure 4 than in the data presented
by Solt. This is a consequence of the unusually
low bound for ‘all’, which goes down to 80%. The
exact value of this bound changes depending on
the exact set of utterances available to the speaker.
For instance, the availability of ‘almost all’ would
push the lower bound for ‘all’ higher up on the
scale. The second difference is that the upper
bound of ‘more than half’ goes higher than in the
data presented by Solt. The positions of the involved bounds are sensitive to the parameter values.
For instance, figure 5 shows a parameter setting
that makes predictions closes to Solt’s data. Moreover, the upper bound of ‘more than half’ is also
sensitive to the set of alternatives. For instance,
including proportions such as ‘three fourths’ would
push the upper bound of ‘more than half’ closer to
0.5.
5.2 Ignoring the mechanisms
In order to see what role each of the two mechanisms play in the predictions of the model above,
it is instructive to observe the consequences of ignoring each of the two mechanisms.
When both mechanisms are ignored, the result
is a simple RSA model as described in 4.1. In
particular, we consider an RSA model with different costs for the signals. The results are shown
in figure 6. When both mechanisms are ignored
and production costs are implemented, speaker S2
does not introduce any substantial innovation over
the listener L1 , and therefore we stop the computation at the level of L1 . The effect of cost in this
setting is simply to make S1 ’s production probability for ‘more than half’ uniformly lower than
the one of ‘most’ for any given state. However,
the difference in cost cannot be exploited by L1
to draw an inference about the state observed by
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Figure 5: The plots shows the results with |A| = 100,
α = 5 and ρ = 0.5. This parameter setting produces
results closer to Solt’s observed typical sets for ‘most’
and ‘more than half’.

S1 . In sum, a difference in cost alone without the
mechanisms discussed above cannot be exploited
by a pragmatic speaker to convey different information with truth-conditionally equivalent signals.
For similar reasons, when only the first mechanism,
namely the structural account of alternatives, is ignored, all utterances compete with each other, and
therefore S2 does not introduce interesting results.
Again, since the symmetry is not broken by the
different set of alternatives, ‘most’ and ‘more than
half’ end up conveying identical information to S1 .
When only the second mechanism—the distanceminimizing listener—is ignored, we still obtain the
crucial result that ‘more than half’ is generally used
to convey proportions closer to the scale’s midpoint
than ‘half’. However, the results differ from section 4 in two crucial ways. First, the speaker S2
ends up producing each signal with uniform probability within the pragmatically enriched category,
as shown in figure 8. For instance, ‘more than half’
is produced with uniform probability for proportions above 1/2 and below 1/3. Second, the model
without distance-minimizing L2 predicts that the
speaker would use ‘all’ and ‘none’ exclusively for
the maximum and minimum of the scale respectively. These two consequences contradict both
Solt’s data and the data in Pezzelle et al. (2018).
In the data, the production probabilities for ‘more
than half’ resembles a Gaussian distribution rather
than a uniform distribution, ‘all’ and ‘none’ are

Figure 7: No distance minimizing.
Figure 6: Results without both mechanisms. We stop
the computation at the level of pragmatic listener L1 .
S1 is less likely to produce ‘more than half’ for any
given state, because of its higher cost. However, L1
does not derive any difference between the information
conveyed by ‘most’ and ‘more than half’, so that the
two lines perfectly overlap for L1 . In this plot, α = 2.
While the speaker in this model can produce all signals,
for ease of comparison with the previous plots we only
plot the 6 signals that the speaker could produce in the
previous models. We model the cost of each utterance
simply as the number of words in the utterance: ‘all’,
‘most’, ‘none’, and ‘some’ get cost 1, while all other
signals get cost 4.

used for signals close to the scale’s extremes rather
than exclusively to the extremes.
In this section, we have shown that the two mechanisms discussed in section 3 are not only independently motivated, but are also both needed to
make sense of the difference in typical sets between
‘most’ and ‘more than half’.

6

Conclusions

‘Most’ and ‘more than half’, while traditionally
assumed to be truth-conditionally equivalent, are
typically associated with different proportions. In
the most developed explanation of this difference,
Solt (2016) introduces a difference between the
structures of the scales used by the two expressions.
In contrast, in this paper we proposed a novel account of the difference that is based on independently motivated mechanisms and does not rely on
different scale structures. Moreover, we analysed
the predictions of the account by implementing it
in a popular computational model of pragmatic reasoning, the RSA model. Further and especially
experimental work is needed to compare the empirical accuracy of the different emerging accounts
342

Figure 8: Results without the second mechanism: when
the distance-minimizing listener is substituted with the
pragmatic listener of equation 4, speaker S2 has a uniform probability of producing ‘more than half’ across
its whole pragmatically enriched domain. Only L1 and
S2 are plotted as L0 and S1 are essentially the same as
in figure 4.

of the differences between ‘most’ and ‘more than
half’.
The work we presented can be extended in various possible directions. First, a similar model
could be used to account for the usage of modifier numerals, since a similar contrast to the one
discussed here can be found e.g. between ‘more
than 100’ and ‘more than 101’, where the typical
guessed number for the former utterance is higher
than the for the latter. Second, the model above can
be used to fit experimental production data with
quantifiers. A third possible development would
look at whether the model predicts that the quantifiers’ thresholds stay the same even in downward
entailing contexts, as suggested by the experimental data in Denić and Szymanik (2020). Lastly, in
the models presented in this paper we only considered a small set of alternative proportions for ‘half’,
namely ‘one third’ and ‘two thirds’. However, it
would be valuable to study the predictions of the
model when more alternative utterances, containing more complex proportions, are included. We
leave all these exciting possible developments to
future work.
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2018. Conceptual alternatives: Competition in language and beyond.
Fausto Carcassi. 2020. The Cultural Evolution of
Scalar Categorization. PhD Thesis, University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh.
Emmanuel Chemla. 2007. French both: a gap in the
theory of antipresupposition.
Mark Davies. 2017. Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA).
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